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BLD-156       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1052 
 ___________ 
 
 DR. MAXIMO GOMEZ NACER, 
   Appellant 
v. 
 
JERRY CAPUTO, Assistant Superintendent  
of Human Resources UCBOE, Union City, NJ 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 10-cv-04494) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 5, 2012 
 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed :  April 19, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Dr. Maximo Gomez Nacer appeals pro se from the District Court’s entry of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Jerry Caputo.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Dr. Nacer filed suit pro se in New Jersey state court against Caputo, the Assistant 
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Superintendent of the Union City, New Jersey Board of Education (the “Board”).  Dr. 
Nacer alleges that Caputo terminated his eligibility for substitute high school teaching 
assignments because of his Cuban ancestry and in retaliation for his filing of a claim with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).  Dr. Nacer’s complaint also 
includes a number of unrelated allegations concerning his inability to pursue various 
professional opportunities, deficiencies in the educational system in general, and a patent 
on what he calls “Gravity Buoyancy Technology.”   
 Caputo removed the suit to federal court on the basis of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a).  Caputo answered the complaint and the 
parties engaged in discovery, which included both their depositions.  After the close of 
discovery, Dr. Nacer sought leave to add the Board as a defendant, which the District 
Court denied.  Caputo eventually filed a motion for summary judgment.  Dr. Nacer 
opposed it with a series of motions for a “speedy trial,” which did not marshal any 
evidence in support of his claims or otherwise respond to the relevant issues.  The District 
Court nevertheless addressed Dr. Nacer’s claims on the merits and, on November 30, 
2011, entered summary judgment in Caputo’s favor.  Dr. Nacer appeals.1
II. 
 
                                                 
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s entry of 
summary judgment de novo.  See Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 324 (3d Cir. 2010).  
“‘Summary judgment is appropriate only where, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  Id. (citation omitted).  In opposing the motion, the 
nonmovant must come forward with “‘enough evidence . . . to enable a jury to reasonably find 
for the nonmovant[.]’”  Id. (citation omitted).  We review for abuse of discretion the District 
Court’s denial of leave to amend a complaint, see id. at 324-25, and its discovery rulings, see 
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 235 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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  The District Court properly construed Dr. Nacer’s complaint to raise claims of 
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-1, et seq.  As to the discrimination claim, the District Court explained that Title 
VII does not impose liability on individual employees like Caputo.  See Emerson v. Thiel 
Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).  The District Court also explained that Dr. Nacer 
(1) had not made out a prima facie case by presenting evidence of any nexus between his 
termination and his Cuban ancestry, and that even if he had he (2) failed to present 
evidence rebutting the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his termination that 
Caputo articulated—i.e., the request of two schools that Dr. Nacer no longer be assigned 
to them, one of which complained about his performance and came the day before his 
termination.  See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 
burden-shifting framework under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
 We see no basis to disturb these conclusions.  Dr. Nacer refers on appeal to 
exhibits that purportedly support his claim, but the “speedy trial” motions he filed in 
opposition to summary judgment do not marshal any evidence or make any showing on 
the merits of his claims (which he appears to have attempted to do for the first time in his 
notice of appeal).  Dr. Nacer’s filings instead consist largely of extraneous assertions 
, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973)).  As to the retaliation claim, the District Court explained that Dr. Nacer presented 
no evidence that Caputo even knew about the EEOC complaint (which Caputo denies) 
when he removed Dr. Nacer’s name from the substitute teacher list.  Finally, the District 
Court explained that there was no nexus between Dr. Nacer’s remaining allegations and 
any alleged conduct by Caputo. 
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about the United States educational system in general and his “Gravity Buoyancy 
Technology.”  Cognizant of Dr. Nacer’s pro se status, we have liberally reviewed his 
filings.  We discern only two potentially relevant arguments, and each lacks merit. 
 First, Dr. Nacer argues that, when he went to Caputo’s office to discuss the 
termination, Caputo directed him to “leave the building” because “you have a lawsuit 
against us.”  Dr. Nacer does not explicitly make the argument, but he presumably 
believes that Caputo’s alleged statement is evidence of a retaliatory motive.  As the 
District Court explained, however, Caputo denies that he even knew about the EEOC 
complaint when he terminated Dr. Nacer’s eligibility for assignments, and Dr. Nacer has 
presented no evidence to the contrary.  Caputo’s alleged statement does not constitute 
such evidence.  According to Dr. Nacer’s own recitation of the facts, he filed his EEOC 
complaint on October 1, 2009, Caputo terminated his access to substitute teaching 
assignments on or about December 18, 2009, and Caputo made his statement about the 
lawsuit at some time thereafter.2
 Second, Dr. Nacer asserts that the District Court should have permitted him to add 
the Board as a defendant.  This argument might have some merit if the District Court had 
  Caputo’s alleged statement thus does not raise an 
inference that he knew about the EEOC complaint when he terminated Dr. Nacer’s 
eligibility for teaching assignments, and consequently does not raise an inference of 
retaliation. 
                                                 
2  Dr. Nacer does not argue that the temporal proximity of his termination to his EEOC complaint 
is sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial, and it is not.  See LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 232-33 
(explaining that three-month period between EEOC complaint and adverse action was not 
“unusually suggestive” of retaliation and was insufficient to create genuine issue of material 
fact).   
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disposed of Dr. Nacer’s claims on the sole ground that Caputo is not individually liable 
under Title VII.  The District Court went on to explain, however, why Dr. Nacer had not 
raised a genuine issue of material fact on his underlying claims.  Dr. Nacer has provided 
no reason to believe that the addition of the Board as a defendant (which he first 
requested after discovery had closed) prejudiced his ability to make his case.  He does not 
argue, for example, that he was unable to obtain any particular evidence only because the 
Board was not a party.  And the only discovery he claimed to require from the Board in 
the District Court was information regarding curricula and job-creation that appears 
related solely to his non-actionable complaints about the educational system in general.  
Dr. Nacer also did not file a Rule 56(d) affidavit in opposition to summary judgment or 
anything that the District Court might have construed as such an affidavit.  Thus, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dr. Nacer’s request to add the Board 
as a defendant. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
